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Abstract—Current mainstream Evolutionary Algo-
rithms (EA) are based on the concept of selection, en-
capsulated in the definition of a fitness function. Besides
selection, however, the natural evolutionary process in-
cludes a phenomenon of elimination, which is linked to
the ideas of viability and contingency. In this paper, we
show how elimination can be modeled and integrated
with selection to give rise to a new evolutionary scheme
that we call Selection-Elimination EA (SE-EA). Comparing
conventional EA to the newly defined SE-EA we show that
SE-EA can exploit naturally some prior information about
the problem at hand that is seldom, if at all, exploited
by conventional EA, while avoiding the assumption of
knowledge that EA based on the fitness function require
but that is usually not really available. We discuss the
fact that the introduction of elimination in Evolutionary
Computation gives rise to the possibility of obtaining a
multi-level evolutionary process that includes as a central
component the phenomenon of extinction. We suggest the
interpretation of an evolutionary process that includes
elimination, in terms of an error-driven process and derive
from it a new appreciation of the role of the interaction
with the environment in the determination of the outcome
of the process and of the possibility of achieving an open-
ended evolution. The working of the SE-EA are illustrated
with two examples that model its application to multi-
objective engineering problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE methods of Evolutionary Computation (EC) [9],[10], [44] are the result of an attempt to distill in
algorithmic form the workings of the process of biologi-
cal evolution. The ultimate goal is the development of a
set of engineering and problem-solving tools displaying
the adaptive and creative potential usually attributed
to the evolutionary process operating in nature. Many
evolutionary algorithms (EA) inspired to this approach
have been developed and are currently in use within the
EC community, for example, Genetic Algorithms, Evo-
lutionary Strategies, and Genetic Programming [8]. The
ideal starting point for the development of EC method is
obviously our current understanding of the evolutionary
process and its formalization in terms of an evolutionary
theory. Although many aspects of the workings of the
evolutionary process are still controversial [50], there is
a general consensus on attributing a central role in it
to the interplay of variation, inheritance, and differential
reproductive success [20], [69].
Differential reproductive success in nature is the result
of multiple factors that operate at many levels of organi-
zation to influence the probability of survival and repro-
duction of the individuals and of their progeny. Since
biological organisms are, in general, self-reproducing
autonomous entities, the differential reproductive success
of individuals is an implicit consequence of their existing
and behaving in their environment. Due to technological
limitations, in present-day EC experiments the individu-
als are never truly self-reproducing autonomous agents.
Therefore, their differential reproductive success cannot
be obtained simply as a consequence of their existence
and behavior. This means that the experimenter is forced
to intervene in the process to explicitly determine - at
least partially - the reproductive success of the individ-
uals. The presence of this explicit intervention entails
the risk of formulating algorithms that do not mirror the
actual workings of the natural evolutionary process and
are unable to achieve its efficacy.
Of the many possible discrepancies between the struc-
ture of the evolutionary process and that of its algo-
rithmic implementations we consider here the case of
the explicit elimination of the individuals subjected to
the action of the algorithm. We show that this aspect is
usually omitted in current mainstream EA formulations
and try to expose the reasons of this state of things.
Then, we investigate the consequences that this absence
produces on the potential of the resulting algorithms.
Particular emphasis is put on two improvements that the
implementation of explicit elimination can bring to EC:
a substantial enlargement of the range of evolutionary
experiments that can be performed and of the causes
of differential reproductive success that can be modeled,
and the possibility to obtain a multi-level evolutionary
2process. To remedy the neglect of elimination in EC we
introduce a new EA structure that explicitly implements
elimination and integrates it with the selection and
reproduction process that is usually modeled in current
EA. Finally, we discuss the properties of this extended
algorithm and present an example of its application to
multi-objective problems.
Besides elimination there are in the natural evolu-
tionary process other aspects that are likely to be in-
strumental to its achieving the results that we observe
in the biological world and that are poorly if at all
represented in EC models. For example, we can mention
the role played by the structure and dynamics of the
genome [68] in the production of variation; the influence
of the development process [46], of physical constraints,
of self-organization phenomena, and of the structure of
the cellular context where the genome is expressed [59],
[83]; the existence of interactions allowing the emer-
gence of new levels of organization [21], [77], [81].
Adhering to our announced theme, we will not consider
here these further aspects, although we are persuaded
of the importance of considering also their possible role
while building computational models of the evolutionary
process.
II. THE STATUS OF ELIMINATION
Today, almost all EC algorithms are built around the
idea of selection [8], [43], [47]. According to this idea
the individuals of the population prevailing at a certain
time step are allowed to enter the composition of the
population for the next step in a way that is related to
the value of the so-called fitness function. Usually, this
function associates a real value with each individual and,
on average, individuals with higher associated values
contribute with more genetic material to the definition
of the new population than those having lower values.
This process is supposedly modeled on the workings
of natural selection. However, Ernst Mayr notes [78,
pp.117-118]:
What Darwin called natural selection is actu-
ally a process of elimination. . . . Do selection
and elimination differ in their evolutionary
consequences? This question never seems to
have been raised in the evolutionary literature.
Emphasis on the distinction between selection and elim-
ination is indeed rare in the life sciences literature. One
notable exception are the works of P.J. den Boer [34]–
[37] articulating the idea that natural selection is better
seen in terms of ’non-survival of the non-fit’ rather than
in terms of ’survival of the fittest’.
Browsing the EC literature one is readily convinced
that the elimination concept is seldom considered also
within the EC community. Some exceptions are Atmar’s
broad methodological discussion on the simulation of
evolution [3]; the Culling Method of Baum, Boneh, and
Garrett [14], where a culling threshold is established and
the individuals having a value of fitness below the thresh-
old are systematically substituted with above threshold
newly generated ones; the series of papers by Green-
wood, Fogel, et al. [45], [51], where a model inspired to
mass extinction is applied to function optimization; the
Macroevolutionary Algorithms of Marín and Solé [74],
based on the Solé-Manrubia extinction model [101],
where a matrix of species interactions is built and used
to determine species extinction; and Krink and Thom-
sen’s approach [63] inspired to the Bak-Sneppen Self-
Organized Criticality model of evolution and extinction
[97]. None of these approaches, however, adopts the
multi-level elimination perspective nor the idea of a
fluctuating and possibly extinct population that we deem
instrumental in modeling correctly elimination and that
we are going to champion in the present work. Besides
the explicitly EC-oriented elimination approaches listed
above, there is – with a tacit EC spirit – the seminal
suggestion constituted by Braitenberg’s vehicles that
“live” on the surface of a table, are reproduced with
possible mutations, and are eliminated if they fall from
the table [19].
The virtual absence of the elimination concept from
the mainstream EC thinking is probably a consequence
of its absence from the evolutionary literature lamented
by Mayr, since the founders of EC were undoubtedly
inspired by the biological formulations of evolutionary
theory in laying the basis of their algorithmic counter-
parts. To understand the reasons of the scarce explicit
presence of elimination in the evolutionary debate we
must delve into the historical development that led to
our current view of the evolutionary process.
III. NATURAL SELECTION
In the first four chapters of On the Origin of
Species [30] Darwin develops an argument that from
the analysis of the process of artificial selection leads
to the attribution of an adaptive and creative role to
the process of natural selection. Darwin starts by illus-
trating the existence of a great deal of inheritable and
continuously renewed variation within the populations
of domestic animals and plants and proceeds to explain
how this fact was exploited by breeders to produce the
existing domestic races. Darwin identifies the source of
this accomplishment in “man’s power of accumulative
selection”, embodied in the breeders’ uncanny ability
to identify minimal individual variations in the desired
3direction within the raw material constituted by the vari-
ation existing in the population subjected to selection.
Then, Darwin’s efforts are devoted to the illustration
of the fact that a large amount of inheritable and con-
tinuously renewed variation is also a characteristic of
“organic beings in a state of nature”. In other words,
Darwin recognizes in the “state of nature” the presence
of all the elements that preside over the successful
creation of domestic varieties except that of the actively
selecting agent represented by the breeder. With this
in mind, Darwin proceeds to analyze the effects of
the interaction of two observed facts: the potentially
exponential rate of growth of a population and the
long term stability of most populations in nature. The
compresence of these two factors implies that a great part
of a natural population offspring is necessarily doomed
to destruction and that the individuals of those popula-
tions must therefore be engaged in a perpetual struggle
for existence. If some inheritable1 characteristics of the
individuals exist that are apt to increase their probability
of survival and reproduction, a selection based on the
degree of ownership of those characteristics will take
place. Darwin succeeds in this way to prove that an
agentless selection process2 exists and operates in nature.
Note that, as remarked by several authors [24], [50],
[108], many thinkers before Darwin had recognized the
existence of the process of natural selection. However,
most of them attributed to natural selection a purely con-
servative and stabilizing role of elimination of the badly
formed or unfit individuals. According to Gould [50]
the novelty of Darwin’s approach was his attributing to
natural selection an adaptive and creative role, analogous
to that played by the breeders in the production of ex-
isting domestic races. In other words, Darwin revolution
shifted the focus from the conservative role played by
elimination of the unfit to the potentially creative role
played by selection of the fittest.
IV. THE FITNESS SHORTCUT
Although since Darwin’s times many elements have
been added to our understanding of the evolutionary
process, the general picture remains substantially un-
changed. Note that at first sight there is an almost
complete match between the processes of artificial se-
lection and that of natural selection. The degree of
possession of the character desired by the breeder in
artificial selection apparently corresponds to the degree
1Inheritability is required for the selection process to lead to an
evolutionary process, not for the existence of the selection process in
itself.
2Darwin considered also at great length the effects of the agent-
mediated selection process of sexual selection [31].
of possession of the characters favourable to reproductive
survival in the state of nature. However, we see that
the correspondence breaks down when we consider the
possibility of ordering the individuals according to those
criteria. In the case of artificial selection we can ideally
assume that the breeder proceeds by first ranking the
individuals and then allowing only the best to reproduce.
In the case of natural selection, however, the variety
of circumstances that lead to reproductive survival is
usually immense and it appears generally impossible to
estimate a priori (i.e., by looking only at their phenotype
or genotype) the reproductive success of individuals. At
most we can think of ranking the individuals a posteriori,
that is, according to their observed reproductive success
and assuming that it reflects the degree of possession of
favourable characters (possibly, as we will discuss later
on, at multiple levels of organization).
The idea of focusing on a measure of the reproductive
success is actually at the heart of the concept of fitness
as usually defined in evolutionary biology [28], [76],
[81], [91]. For example, the fitness of a genotype can be
defined as the expected number of offspring contributed
by an individual of that type to the next generation [76,
p. 36]. This definition suits perfectly the analysis of the
dynamics of genotype frequencies within gene pools. On
the other hand the problem of associating a value of
fitness with a genotype, apart in very rare circumstances
or as an a posteriori observation3, is not addressed.
Recapitulating, the biologist’s fitness is a value that is
assumed to represent the collective effect of the myriad
of factors that determine the survival and reproductive
success of an individual.
EC has adopted from the start this convenient shortcut
by basing the workings of its algorithms on the concept
of fitness function. As mentioned above, this is a function
that associates a numerical value with each individual
of each generation considered in the course of an EC
experiment. This value then determines (possibly prob-
abilistically) the reproductive success of the individual.
This fact justifies calling the numerical value the fitness
of the individual. Note, however, that the logic4 is
reversed relatively to the biologist’s definition. There, the
reproductive success was assumed as a measured numer-
ical value and called fitness5; here, a numerical value is
given and steps are taken to ensure that the expected
reproductive success assumes that value. A moment of
reflection suffices to convince that this reversal does not
alter the dynamics of the genotype frequencies.
3And even in that case, with some nontrivial open questions [27].
4Or, better, the direction of the chain of causation.
5In fact, the observed value is an estimate of the fitness defined as
the expected value of reproductive success [76], [98].
4The central question for EC, however, is if the re-
versal is justified from the point of view of the out-
comes that we can expect from the resulting process
in terms of adaptation and evolution. In other words,
can we assign directly what in nature is the result of a
complicated ensemble of factors and still maintain the
essential characteristics of the process? To answer this
question we need to examine the nature of the factors
that eventually determine the survival and reproductive
success of individuals in nature to ascertain if in the
current EC approach the structure of the process is
modeled with sufficient fidelity, at the correct level of
organization, and focusing on the right subjects, for the
adaptive and creative potential of the original process to
be preserved. This means that we need to examine not
only the outcome of the evolutionary process but also
how the process works [93], [94], [98].
V. ELIMINATION AND SELECTION
Semantically, given a finite set of elements, the elim-
ination of the elements of a subset corresponds to the
selection of the elements of the complementary subset,
and vice versa. Therefore one may wonder about the
meaning of Mayr’s abovementioned distinction of a
processes of selection from one of elimination. Once
again we can turn to Darwin for inspiration, and in
particular to his clarifications concerning the meaning
of the expression “struggle for existence” [30, p. 116]:
I should premise that I use the term Struggle
for Existence in a large and metaphorical sense
. . . . Two canine animals in a time of dearth,
may be truly said to struggle with each other
which shall get food and live. But a plant on
the edge of a desert is said to struggle for life
against the drought, though more properly it
should be said to depend on the moisture.
These two examples of struggle for existence differ
in one important point. In the first case there is a
direct comparison of the aptitudes of the two animals in
contending for the available food, whereas the resistance
of the plant to drought is not compared with that of
another plant to determine if it must survive or not.
We can reformulate and generalize this distinction
as follows. There are cases where the individuals of
a population or of a group are ordered according to
some criterion (for example, fecundity, or the outcome
of direct fights) and their relative reproductive success is
determined by that ordering. In other cases, however, no
ranking of individuals is implied, since each individual
faces and must survive a challenge that is “absolute”
in the sense that the outcome does not depend on how
well the individual fares relatively to other individuals
confronted with the same challenge. Following Mayr’s
usage and to avoid clumsy circumlocutions we will call
the first kind of events selections (or selection events)
and the second kind eliminations (or elimination events).
The term evolutionary event will be used to denote both
kinds of events6.
The cases where the ability of one individual in
accessing a resource influences indirectly its availability
to other individuals appear at first sight ambiguous
relatively to the classification just introduced. However,
if there is no direct comparison of individuals, each one
is actually facing the “absolute” problem of the scarcity
of a resource. We could, it is true, conceive a laboratory
experiment aimed at determining the minimal amount of
the resource required by each particular individual to stay
alive and this would indeed allow the ranking of the indi-
viduals according to this characteristic. Nonetheless, the
actual living conditions experienced by the individuals
and the actual amount of the resource available to each
of them depends on many contingent conditions and,
therefore, the actual outcome of the struggle for existence
does not correspond to that hypothetical ranking.
In this perspective, each individual of a population
faces during its lifetime a sequence of evolutionary
events, each of which can be an elimination or a se-
lection. The rate of the two kinds of evolutionary events
encountered by the individuals of a certain population
will probably depend on the kind of social organization
of the population. Nonetheless, a certain number of
elimination events will be in any case experienced by
the individuals of every population. In particular, we can
assume that there is a continuous flow of elimination
events that an organism must face, that constituted by
the ongoing implicit assessment of its actual viability
given the prevailing environmental conditions.
It is clear that the fitness function approach commonly
adopted in EC, with its total ordering of the individuals,
is appropriate only for the modeling of what we have
called selection events. Therefore, the question raised
above about the EC approach to the modeling of the
evolutionary process can be reformulated as follows: can
the (lack of a) separate representation of the elimination
events make a difference on the setting and possible
outcome of the modelled evolutionary process? We will
6The outcome of elimination events contributes to the differential
reproductive success of individuals. Hence, elimination events and
selection events are both parts of an overall selection process, whose
ordering criterion is the measured differential reproductive success.
Note that this usage of the term “selection” implies an ordering of
individuals (but see [102] for a commentary on the conflation of the
concepts of sorting and selection).
5see that there are indeed multiple reasons suggesting the
explicit presence of elimination events in EC models.
Some of these reasons, however, can be appreciated only
after realizing that an evolutionary process can take place
at various levels of organization.
VI. EVOLUTIONARY ENTITIES
The evolutionary process was originally conceived
as applying to individual organisms in a population.
However, once the structure of the process is laid out
it becomes apparent that it applies in general to entities
that satisfy a small set of requirements. As expressed by
Lewontin [69]:
The generality of the principles of natural
selection means that any entity in nature that
have variation, reproduction, and heritability
may evolve. . . . the principles can be ap-
plied equally to genes, organisms, populations,
species, and at the opposite ends of the scale,
prebiotic molecules and ecosystems.
We can say, therefore, that the evolutionary process
applies in general to evolutionary entities [28]. We can
broadly call those entities individuals no matter at what
level of organization they are situated, and populations or
groups the ensembles formed by individuals. This reveals
the existence of a multi-level structure where what is
a population or a group at a given level can be seen
as individual at the next higher one. In this sense we
can speak in general of group selection for evolutionary
events taking place at the next higher level relatively to
that of the entities assumed as individuals.
The issue of the natural evolutionary entities that can
legitimately assumed to be the subjects of evolutionary
events is an old and far from settled one. Many words
have been spent on the controversy about the levels of
selection and the relevance of group selection within
the biological evolutionary process [37], [49], [60], [61],
[69], [91], [98], [105], [106]. In particular, it has been
argued that given a selection process operating at a
certain level, a selection process operating at higher
levels – although logically conceivable – has a much
weaker effect and can be hardly considered a driving
force of evolution [105] (but, for example, see [50]
for a critique of this position). Despite this and other
reservations, a certain consensus is emerging on the
fact that evolutionary events at higher levels can in-
fluence the final outcome of the process [50], [60],
[69], [72], [90], [100], [106]. Consequently, in modeling
the evolutionary process we must be sure to allow the
possibility of higher organization levels to exist, act as
evolutionary entities, and make their presence felt at the
“bookkeeping” level [50]. We will come back later on
this topic to motivate our claim that the presence of
elimination in an EA is instrumental to the existence of
that possibility (although, in itself, this presence does not
automatically guarantee that this possibility is exploited
by the implementations of the algorithm).
VII. MODELING ELIMINATION AND SELECTION
So far we have discussed in qualitative terms the
characteristics of selection and elimination events. Our
final goal is the definition of an EA implementing both
kinds of event; the first step consists in building a
mathematical model of them. The implementation of
a selection event requires the definition of a function
whose values determine the ranking of the individuals
of the population. Let us call this function the selection
function  : I! S, where I is the set of possible individ-
uals (phenotypes) and S is a totally ordered set [66], for
example, the set R of real numbers. We assume that each
phenotype  2 I derives from a genotype  belonging to
a suitable space  . The ranking of the individuals of
the population determined by  is used by the EA to
reproduce (possibly) differentially their genotype. Note
that the selection function alone does not determine what
biologists call the fitness of the individuals, which will
be instead determined jointly by selection – modeled
through the selection function – and elimination – mod-
eled through the viability function introduced below.
For this reason we do not call  the “fitness function”.
Apart from this difference in terminology, the selection
function plays the role of what is called fitness function
in traditional EA [18], [47], [48].
A. Elimination through Viability
The case of elimination is less familiar when it comes
to modeling it. Since we are dealing here with the
survival of organisms, we can get some inspiration from
the concept of homeostasis, introduced by Cannon [25]
and widely used by Ashby [2]. The central idea is that
to survive every organism must always maintain a set
of physiological parameters within certain limits. We
can imagine that for each parameter there is a viability
range (or, more generally, a viability set) within which
it must be maintained [4], [6]. Note incidentally that
the maintenance of the physiological parameters within
the viability set is not in itself the organism’s goal,
this being rather its own self-preservation7 (i.e., the
7Laborit [65] presents a instructive account of how not many
years ago the accepted medical practice was in some cases aimed
at restoring some physiological parameter at its ”normal” value even
if, as it was later realized, the effect of this intervention was the
exacerbation of a pre-existing physiological stress.
6control of a relationship pertaining to a higher level
of organization [13]). To model the idea of viability
range we define a viability function  : I ! V where
V is a viability space that, contrary to the case of S,
need not have an order relation defined in it. Then, we
assume as given a viability set V  V and define as
viable an individual  2 I if and only if its viability
value lies within the viability set8, that is, if and only if
() 2 V . This determines a set I of viable individuals
within the space I of individuals (Figure 1). At each time
step of the EC experiment we can evaluate the viability
of the individuals of the population and proceed to the
elimination of non-viable individuals9. This will be an
instance of an elimination event according to this model.
Figure 1. A diagrammatic representation of the viability space V
enclosing the viability set V , and of the viability function  assigning
viability values to the elements  of the space of individuals I. In the
case represented here individual 1 is viable since (1) 2 V whereas
individual 2 is not viable. Each individual (phenotype)  derives from
a genotype  belonging to a space   of genotypes (not represented
here).
To expose the rationale behind the definition of this
model let us illustrate how it can be applied in practice.
Let us consider a problem that could be the target of
an algorithm implementing the model, for example, the
design of an electronic circuit, say, an amplifier. In the
context of such a problem a genotype  will represent a
symbolic description of the circuit and the individuals
 will correspond to the actual circuit described by
 [62]. The goal of the design is the determination of
at least one circuit having an ensemble of character-
istics (cost, amplification, noise, efficiency, component
count, . . . ) within specified ranges, that is, a circuit
with given specifications. For each characteristic c in
the ensemble we can define a function c : I ! Vc
8Biologists often adopt a softer definition of viability (for example,
the proportion of surviving individuals of a given type [99]). This
could be modeled substituting fuzzy sets [80] to the crisp sets used in
our definition, but at the risk of obtaining a model formally equivalent
to the one based on the selection function defined previously.
9Note that this mechanism complies with the definition of extinctive
selection within existing EA [8]. However, in current EA, extinctive
selection – when applied – is based on the preliminary ordering of
the individuals of the population, whereas the viability elimination
just defined is not.
that associates with a circuit  its value c() of the
characteristic (for example, the amplifier gain), where Vc
is a suitable space. The ensemble of admissible values
for the characteristic is assigned as a set Vc  Vc. It
follows that a circuit  is acceptable – i.e., viable – if
c() 2 Vc for each characteristic c. This corresponds to
the model introduced above, with the viability space V
defined as the Cartesian product of the spaces Vc, the
viability set V defined as the product of the sets Vc, and
the functions c interpreted as the components of the
viability function 10. The set I of viable individuals
then corresponds to the set of circuits complying with
the given specifications11.
B. Dynamic Viability
The model presented above is adequate for static sce-
narios, where the viability conditions do not change with
time. An EA applying this model to our circuit design
problem would be required to find a set of viable circuits
by generating tentative circuits and eliminating those
that do not comply with the given ensemble of static
specifications. In practice, however – and irrespective of
the details of the operation of the algorithm – it would be
unwise to target directly a set of stringent specifications.
It would be instead preferable to start with a suitably
relaxed set of specifications and proceed to tighten
them in the course of the algorithm’s execution. This
view is corroborated by the example of technological
evolution, where the accumulation of knowledge about
past achievements is one of the factors leading to the
improvement of attainable performances.
To model this variable viability set we can define a
time parameter t 2 T , where T is the set of time instants
that enter the evolutionary experiment. Then, we can
generalize the notation introduced above, moving from
a static viability set to a time-dependent viability set
V (t)  V. The ensemble of all these sets constitute
a viability tube12  = fV (t)gt2T defined within the
viability space-time. VT . An individual will then trace
a trajectory t 7! () in VT , and will remain viable as
long as its trajectory stays within the viability tube [5]
(Figure 2). Analogous structures can be defined in the
space I T .
This time-dependent definition enlarges substantially
the range of problems to which the viability elimination
10More generally, the viability set can be determined by member-
ship conditions on combinations of the functions c. Thus, V is not
necessarily assigned as the Cartesian product of separately defined
sets Vc.
11From this perspective, the data sheet of a device contains the
manufacturer’s description of its viability set.
12We can represent  also as a set-valued map t V (t) [5], [7].
7Figure 2. A schematic representation of the space VT enclosing
the viability tube  = fV (t)gt2T and the viability trajectory ()
of an individual  that remains viable during the whole time interval
T .
model can be applied. However, there are still many
applications of EC interest that do not fit well into
it. An example is the design of a control system –
say, a neural network – for a robot whose task is the
realization of a behavior such as obstacle avoidance in
the environment where it is placed. It would be most
natural to declare non viable the robots that, for example,
crash into obstacles or let their batteries discharge while
away from the recharging station. It is clear that in this
case the viability of an individual is determined not so
much by the phenotype  in itself as by the behavior
that it brings about. This, in turn, depends also on the
interaction of the robot with its environment.
In terms of our model, this means that the viability of
the robot cannot be a function of its sole phenotype .
We can assume that all the information that is relevant
to the assessment of its behavior (structure of the phe-
notype included) is represented by a variable 

(t) that
represents its state [15], [92]. The internal dynamics of
the robot and its interaction with the environment will
be reflected in the dynamics of the state13. Therefore,
the robot’s viability can be represented as a function
(

(t)) of the state. This means that we now have a
viability function of the kind  : X! V, where X is the
state space. The behavior of the robot will translate into a
trajectory t 7! (

(t)) in VT . As in the previous case,
an individual will remain viable as long as its viability
trajectory stays within the viability tube (Figure 3) and
will be eliminated as soon as it abandons it. Note that
this more general model of viability elimination can be
thought of as including the two previously defined ones
as special cases. A redefinition of the selection function
as a function  : X! S of the state of an individual is
also possible and straightforward.
13For example, the state dynamics could be described by a dy-
namical system composed by the equations _(t) = f((t); E(t); t)
and _E(t) = g((t); E(t); t), where E(t) represents the state of
the environment [2], [15], [71]. This models in particular the fact
that through its behavior an agent can actively select and modify its
environment.
Figure 3. The viability trajectory (()) of an individual whose
viability is defined as a function of its state (t). An individual is
eliminated if and when its viability trajectory leaves the viability tube
.
C. Discussion
As anticipated in the introduction, the viability elim-
ination model entails a number of advantages relatively
to the usual selection-based approaches. A first obvious
observation is the fact that inequality constraints that de-
fine an infeasible region for the search space [33] can be
directly interpreted and enforced as viability conditions.
Other interesting properties ensue from the fact that,
contrary to the case of selection – where the space S must
be ordered and, in fact, usually corresponds to R – with
this model we deal with a function  that takes its values
in a generic set V. This means, among other things,
that  can easily represent multiple independent viability
conditions, as illustrated by the amplifier design example
mentioned above. This has significant consequences on
how evolutionary experiments can be set up and run.
First, an individual can be subjected to multiple viabil-
ity criteria that have a different nature and are therefore
not directly comparable. With the traditional selection
approach, instead, we would be forced to aggregate
these incommensurable criteria in a single real-valued
function. Furthermore, we can easily add a new viability
criterion or drop an existing one independently from
the other criteria, whereas with an aggregated selec-
tion function the modification of a selective criterion
requires the redefinition of the whole function. This fact
allows in particular the setup of EC experiments with
a steadily increasing number and severity of viability
criteria, which can be useful in the perspective of incre-
mental evolution [85]. Another important consequence
of this property is that we can prune more efficiently the
set of trials generated by the evolutionary process. As
Campbell has put it, referring to the traditional example
of the group of chimpanzees typing at random in the
experimenter’s hope of producing by chance all of the
books in the British Museum [22, p. 106] (see also [106,
p. 127])
In biological evolution and in thought, the
number of variation explored is greatly re-
duced by having selective criteria imposed at
8every step. . . . It is this strategy of cumulating
selected outcomes from blind variation, and
then exploring further blind variations only for
this highly selected stem, that, as R.A. Fisher
has pointed out . . . , makes the improbable
inevitable in organic evolution. . . . In con-
structing our “universal library” we stop work
on any volume as soon as it is clear that it is
gibberish.
Obviously, this step by step selective process can be
easily implemented in terms of elimination but hardly if
at all in terms of selection, since preliminary outcomes
at different stages are unlikely to be comparable. Finally,
thanks to the independence of the various viability
conditions and to the viability being a function of the
state, different individuals can be subjected to different
elimination events, thus greatly increasing the variety of
evolutionary events available for the individuals of the
population.
The viability elimination approach entails also an-
other, less apparent consequence. We allude to the fact
that the assignment of a viability set implies the ex-
istence of some knowledge about the results that can
be expected from the evolutionary process. In EC it is
instead usually assumed that no information is available
about the range of results achievable. However, this
stance – due probably to the prevalence of the selection-
centered perspective combined with an earlier focus of
EC on function optimization – appears questionable.
For example, in the amplifier design example introduced
above a lot of information is usually available on the
combined ranges of performances (cost, amplification,
noise, efficiency, . . . ) that can be attained. It would be
clearly unreasonable to ignore that prior information in
modeling the problem and setting up the experiment14.
In sum, we see that the reduced requirements in terms
of mathematical structure of the codomain15 of the via-
bility function relatively to those of the selection function
have a beneficial impact on the nature and variety of
evolutionary events that can be modeled. Moreover, as
observed by Mayr [78, pp.118], the action of what is
represented in our model by viability elimination in place
of selection can have a favourable effect in terms of
variance of the resulting population:
A process of selection would have a concrete
objective, the determination of the “best” or
14Note, however, that even if no prior information is assumed, an
initial population can be usually randomly generated and used to
assign a (possibly very permissive) initial viability set to be then
shrunk during the experiment.
15The codomain of a function f : D ! C is the set C where the
function takes its values [66].
“fittest” phenotype. Only relatively few indi-
viduals in a given generation would qualify
and survive the selection procedure. This small
sample would be able to preserve only a small
amount of the whole variance of the parental
population. Such survival selection would be
highly restrained. By contrast, a mere elimina-
tion of the less fit might permit the survival of
a rather large number of individuals because
they have no obvious deficiencies in fitness.
In fact, according to Mayr, the appreciation of the
presence of abundant variance within natural populations
and of the related concept of population thinking [78] are
essential for a correct understanding of the workings of
the evolutionary process.
We are now in the position to define the structure of
an evolutionary algorithm (EA) that implements both the
selection and the elimination processes. We will call such
algorithm a Selection-Elimination EA16 (SE-EA). The
traditional EA algorithm – that we will call Selection-
Based EA (SB-EA) – will be a particular case of it,
obtained by skipping the elimination part of the SE-
EA, whereas by skipping the selection part (e.g., using a
constant function as selection function ) we will obtain
an Elimination-Based EA (EB-EA).
VIII. SELECTION-ELIMINATION EA
An SE-EA has many elements in common with an
SB-EA. Therefore its presentation and symbolism can
be loosely based on those used to define the General
Evolutionary Algorithm [8]. The discrete time steps (or
generations) are indicated by integer numbers t 2 T ,
starting with t = 0, where T is the time domain of
the experiment. The population at time t is denoted by
P (t) and is composed by elements  of the space of
individuals (or phenotypes) I. As anticipated above, each
phenotype  derives from a genotype  in the space of
genotypes   and is endowed with a state 

(t) that takes
its values in the state space X. Note that 

(t) must not
be considered a pre-assigned function of time but rather
a quantity that unfolds in time during the experiment
according to the structure of the phenotype and of the
environment. However, for many simple problems 

(t)
ends up corresponding simply to the phenotype .
With some abuse of notation, when no confusion is to
be feared we will use the symbol P to denote both the set
of genotypes and that of phenotypes of the population,
and will suppose that access to the phenotype implies the
16Alternative names could be Homeostatic EA, and Viability EA,
although, as explained below, the viability elimination is not the only
kind of elimination present in the algorithm.
9access to the corresponding genotype and to the state
of the individual. The number of individuals in P (t)
is denoted by (t). We will not adopt here the ; 
symbolism typical of Evolutionary Strategies [8], [9] to
distinguish the number of offspring and parent individ-
uals. We will use instead a sequence P 0(t); P 00(t) : : : to
denote the successive temporary populations produced
by the algorithm and the symbol (P (t)) to denote
their cardinality. As described above, we define a vi-
ability function  : X ! V and a selection function
 : X ! S. To simplify the notation, the sets of
viability and selection values f(

(t));  2 P (t)g and
f(

(t));  2 P (t)g will be denoted by V (P (t)) and
S (P (t)), respectively.
We define then a selection and reproduction operator
r(P (t);S(P (t)) that takes as arguments a population
P (t) and the corresponding set of selection values
S(P (t)) and produces a new set of individuals17. The
action of the operator r corresponds to that of the
selection and reproduction operators used in current
EA [8], [18], [32]. To this familiar operator the SE-
EA adds two elimination operators. The first is the
viability elimination operator ev(P (t);V(P (t); V (t)). It
takes as arguments a population P (t), the corresponding
set of viability values V(P (t)), and the current viability
set V (t); and returns a population constituted by the
viable individuals of P (t). It corresponds obviously to
the action of the viability elimination events discussed
above. The other elimination operator is the contingency
elimination operator ec(P (t)). It takes as argument a
population and discards from it some “unlucky” indi-
viduals, to prevent population explosion when the joint
action of selection and of viability elimination does not
lead to a sufficient reduction of the population. The role
and interpretation of ec will be detailed later on. Note
that all these operators are usually characterized by a set
of parameters (for example, the mutation and crossover
probability of a reproduction operator r [47], or the
maximum number of individuals that the contingency
elimination operator ec must return), although we do not
explicitly mention them in our symbolism.
Since, as noted above, the viability set can change at
each time step (Figure2) we define a viability set update
operator u(V (t)) that takes as argument the current
viability set and returns the viability set that will be used
17We could imagine reproduction taking place at time instants
belonging to a subset of the time domain of the experiment. This
would be probably more plausible in the cases where the individuals
are endowed with a state unfolding in time with a consequent ongoing
viability assessment. To keep simple the description of algorithm we
will not consider further this otherwise reasonable distinction.
in the next time step18. Finally, ! (P (t); : : : ; P (0); t)
denotes a termination criterion, which can in general
depend on the whole history of the population and on the
number of time steps executed. With these provisions,
Algorithm 1 describes the basic structure of the SE-EA.
Algorithm 1 : The Selection-Elimination EA
t := 0;
initialize population P 0(0)
assign viability set V (0);
eliminate for viability:
P (0) := ev(P 0(0);V(P 0(0)); V (0));
while (not (! (P (t); : : : ; P (0); t))) do
select and reproduce:
P 0(t) := r(P (t);S(P (t)));
eliminate for viability:
P 00(t) :=ev(P 0(t)[P (t);V(P 0(t)[P (t));V (t));
eliminate for contingency:
P (t+ 1) := ec(P 00(t));
update viability set:
V (t+ 1) = u(V (t));
t := t+ 1;
od
Note that according to Algorithm 1 the viability
elimination operator ev acts on the newly generated
individuals and on those of the previous generation.
There is however no loss of generality in always writing
the old population as an argument of ev since we can
still define ev as eliminating all the old individuals.
With this assumption the formalism will permit both
the implementation of steady-state and of generational
EA [8], [9]. Moreover, for the sake of generality, the
viability of the old population is assumed as being
re-evaluated at each time step, even if in some cases
the viability values and the viability set may not have
changed from the previous time step.
This view of the evolutionary process, with its separate
modeling of selection and elimination processes, seems
to be close in spirit to that entertained by Darwin. As
mentioned earlier, besides natural selection Darwin con-
sidered at length sexual selection. Introducing the subject
in The Descent of Man Darwin gives the following
definition [31, p. 256]
18As will become clear later on in discussing the issue of popu-
lation explosion, it is often useful to pass as additional parameters
to the viability set update operator u the current population and the
tentatively generated new ones.
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We are . . . here concerned only with that kind
of selection, which I have called sexual se-
lection. This depends on the advantage which
certain individuals have over other individuals
of the same sex and species, in exclusive
relation to reproduction
In their introduction to the reprint of The Descent of
Man [31, p. xxviii], Bonner and May wrote:
Darwin did . . . see “sexual selection” as a
mechanism somewhat distinct from “natural
selection” (which he often tended to treat as
pertaining to survival) . . . .
If Bonner and May’s interpretation of Darwin’s attitude
is correct (see also Michod [81, p. 13]), we can attribute
to Darwin a propensity to distinguish quite clearly nat-
ural selection from sexual selection, and - as suggested
by Mayr in the opening quotation - to see the former as
an elimination process. It is sometimes argued [96] that
present day EA are focused on natural selection and do
not provide an implementation of sexual selection. If we
adhere to Darwin’s definition, however, we must recog-
nize that what is implemented in present day EA, being
centered on selection aimed at reproduction, corresponds
actually to sexual selection and it is instead Darwin’s
concept of natural selection that is poorly represented in
current EC practice.
IX. EXTINCTION
One of the consequences of the presence of an elim-
ination step within an EA is the possibility that at a
given time instant no viable individuals exist within a
population, which therefore becomes extinct. At first
sight, the idea of an EC experiment contemplating the
extinction of the population appears ludicrous. However,
consider the implications of using instead an algorithm
whose structure excludes a priori a similar event, for
example one where - as in most current EC experiments
- the sole selection is at work. The tacit stance in this case
is the willingness to accept in any case the outcome of
the execution of the algorithm, no matter how “good” the
resulting population is in absolute terms; in other words,
the experiment becomes a self-confirming process.
In some cases - especially in the realm of engineering
parameter optimization - some preliminary conditions
are given that assure the acceptability of the results.
In many other cases, however, it is often the case that
the final results are judged unsatisfying and brushed
off. In this sense most EC experiments to date can
be said to have ended up with the tacit extinction
of the final population. From this point of view, the
systematic occurrence of extinction in an EC experiment
implementing elimination should not be considered a
fault but merely a sign that something is wrong either
in our expectations or in the process that we have
concocted to fulfill them. Moreover, an EC experiment
where by definition the population cannot go extinct
must be considered analogous to a scientific theory that
cannot be falsified [87] and to that experiment we can
apply, mutatis mutandis, Rushton’s remark (as quoted
by Platt [86]): “A theory which cannot be mortally
endangered cannot be alive”.
More concretely, in an evolutionary perspective the
extinction of a population can constitute an instance of
elimination for an higher level evolutionary entity. Con-
versely, in the absence of extinction the very existence
evolutionary entities of higher level is jeopardized. In
other words, the possibility of extinction is a central
component for any model of the evolutionary process
considered as a potentially multi-level process. Note,
however, that this is true only if extinction derives from
the elimination of lower level evolutionary entities. For
example, the cases of EA cited in the Introduction that
implement the concept of extinction define this concept
directly at the species level and do not contemplate the
existence of other evolutionary levels. Therefore, these
approaches cannot result in a multi-level evolutionary
process.
X. POPULATION EXPLOSION
The size of unchecked populations in nature is po-
tentially subject to an exponential rate of growth. This
means that, besides extinction, EC modeling must deal
with another critical issue: population explosion. Current
EA usually solve the problem by defining the selection
and reproduction operators in ways that assure the sta-
bility or even the constancy of population size [8], [48].
This prevents simultaneously both the extinction and the
unbounded growth of the population. We can of course
adopt the same straightforward approach to settle the
case of population explosion in SE-EA. The presence in
SE-EA of the elimination operators, however, opens the
way to fresh approaches to the problem. To understand
what algorithmic models could be fruitfully implemented
it is useful to consider briefly the real-world counterpart
of this issue and its biological and ecological models.
How the delicate balance is obtained that keeps most
of the time a natural population away from explosive
growth is still matter of debate between population ecol-
ogists [37], [73], [104]. Simplifying at the extreme the
state of the debate, we can single out two major attitudes
towards the problem. The first, originally championed by
Nicholson [84], sees the population as a regulated system
controlled by density-dependent limiting factors. This
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approach is questioned by some scholars (for example,
see the discussion and references in [37]) who observe
that one cannot assume the stability of the populations
as a datum, since, for example, field observations show
that populations can experience large density fluctua-
tions and multiple episodes of local extinction followed
by repopulation, while no density-dependent regulating
factor can be explicitly recognized. According to some
of this critics the limitation of population size, apart
from isolated episodes of resource exhaustion, seems to
be mostly due to density independent factors, usually
represented by contingent environmental factors [34],
[37], [95]. Without taking side in this debate, we will
briefly illustrate how both these mechanisms can be
easily modeled within the SE-EA framework using the
viability and contingency elimination operators.
Let us start by considering the case of density-
dependent limiting factors. If the EC experiment im-
plements the interaction of each individual with the
environment and with other individuals, a more crowded
environment can result automatically in a greater diffi-
culty for individuals in maintaining viability. Thus, the
existence of density-dependent factors can ensue even
with a fixed viability set. With simpler implementations
that do not model these interactions we can still represent
the presence of density dependent factors by linking the
“size” of the viability set V to the cardinality of the pop-
ulation (or to the local density of the population, if the
experiment implements a spatially distributed population
and local viability sets are used). This manipulation of
the viability set can be performed by the viability set
update operator u. To this effect, u would take as ad-
ditional parameter the current population and, possibly,
the tentatively generated new ones. Density-independent
contingent limiting factors can be instead modeled using
the expressly defined contingent elimination operator ec.
For example, ec could operate by eliminating randomly
individuals of the tentatively newly generated population
if its size exceeds a given limit.
XI. ERROR-DRIVEN PROCESSES
The modus operandi of natural selection has been
often compared to that of a control system [13], [38].
In fact, the analogy with a regulator was already evoked
by Wallace in the essay he sent to Darwin reporting his
discovery of natural selection [103]19:
The action of this principle is exactly like that
of the steam engine [governor], which checks
and corrects any irregularities almost before
they become evident; and in like manner no
19The term “governor” in the quote is due to Bennet [17].
unbalanced deficiency in the animal kingdom
can ever reach any conspicuous magnitude,
because it would make itself felt at the very
first step, by rendering existence difficult and
extinction almost sure to follow
An engineering control system such as that described
by Wallace, however, is designed with a definite pur-
pose in mind: that of obtaining a prescribed behavior
from a system. No such a purpose can be recognized
in the workings of natural selection. The elimination
perspective permits to show that Wallace’s intuition was
not unfounded by revealing that the two processes share
an important structural characteristic: that of being both
error-driven.
A traditional control system [17], [64], [67] is com-
posed by two subsystems: the controlled system, or
“plant”, and a controller that generates the signals that
are used to control the plant, that is, to assure that its
behavior is the desired one. We speak of closed loop
control if the controller generates the control signals by
comparing the output signals of the plant with some
given reference signals representing its desired behavior.
The comparison gives rise to an error signal, and the
controller is structured so as to transform the error signal
in controlling signals that act to reduce the measured
error. In other words, the error produces an effect that
promotes its own dissolution [16], [64]. In this sense, a
closed loop control system is error-driven [67].
For an engineered control system, it is the responsibil-
ity of the designer to structure the system so as to render
it error-driven, that is, to assure that any deviation from
the desired behavior automatically generates a correcting
action that tends to force the system to resume the
desired behavior [16]. In the case of an evolutionary
entity, we don’t have a predefined desired behavior nor a
designer that takes care of “wiring” the system so as to
make it error-driven. However, the unique circumstance
holds that the absence of viability of an individual leads
automatically to the elimination of the individual itself.
Hence, if we interpret the absence of viability as the
error, we have intrinsically in place a structure where
– as required for a system to be error-driven – the
error promotes its own dissolution. In this sense we can
interpret the process of natural selection as giving birth
to a self-structuring error-driven system. Note that we
have here another reversal of the original logic. In the
case of a closed loop control system we start with an
error and proceed to enforce its elimination thus creating
an error-driven system, whereas in the case of natural
selection we start with an elimination and interpret it as
that of an error thus interpreting the process as error-
driven. It is thanks to this concurrence of the error with
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the process of its elimination that the process can self-
activate itself in nature. On the contrary, usually in EC
experiments the error refers to a “viability” condition that
does not entail the automatic elimination of individuals,
which must be instead enforced by the experimenter. If
this separating the error from its elimination can leave
intact the evolutionary potential of the process is a far
from trivial matter. We will discuss it in the next section.
The fact of being error-driven has interesting con-
sequences on the behavior of a system. Particularly
noteworthy is the fact that, since the effect of the per-
turbations is represented by the error signal, a correcting
action is produced independently of the nature of the
disturbing factor (provided the amplitude and the rate
of generation of the disturbance are not excessive).
Therefore, such a system can face perturbations whose
characteristics were not known in detail (in fact, whose
existence was possibly not even conceived) by the de-
signer. The other side of this property is the fact that no
controlling action is exerted as soon as the error vanishes
or stays within prescribed bounds20. From our evolution-
ary perspective this means that, once the population is
viable and produces a viable progeny, no error is present
and none will be as long as the viability conditions and
the capacity of individuals to maintain viability remain
the same. Hence, no corrective action will be enforced.
In other words in the absence of perturbations such
as a changing environment or the emergence of novel
strategies in the ecological environment, natural selection
interpreted as an error-driven process appears primarily
as a conservative and stabilizing mechanism. However,
– going back to the announced intention of thinking in
terms of how the evolutionary process works – in the
end it is environmental interaction that causes differential
replication [20], [57]. Therefore we must not be surprised
to discover a mechanism that tends to produce a stable
response in the presence of a stable environment21.
Moreover, as observed by Bateson [12, p. 429], “[natural
selection] may act at higher levels to keep constant that
complex variable which we call “survival””. Finally, let
us remark that the evolutionary process results from the
iteration of a two-step cycle [70], [78] where first a
“cloud” of genotypes is produced according to the rules
20This property holds for a number of recently proposed ap-
proaches to the understanding and modeling of biologically related
phenomena. For example, Matzinger’s Danger Model for the opera-
tion of human immune system [75] and Bak and Chialvo’s Extremal
Dynamics approach to learning in neural networks [11], [26]. The
concept evokes also to the Inertia Principle advocated by Aubin in
the context of Viability Theory [4].
21We must also remember that, as pointed out previously, the
environment can change as a consequence of the presence of the
organisms.
of genetic recombination and mutation (and, possibly, of
those of sexual selection) applied to the existing popula-
tion, and then the corresponding cloud of phenotypes is
“shaped” by the effect of natural selection. The natural
selection “shaping force” acts on phenotypes, but its
effects are pulled back on the space of genotypes. From
this point of view, the viability elimination shaping effect
seen in the error-driven perspective can result (if the
state dynamics is absent or elementary) in a very simple,
dichotomic mechanism operating in the phenotype space.
Yet, as will be argued in the next section, it is often the
only one that within an EC context can be justified on
the basis of the information actually available about the
problem at hand.
XII. DISCUSSION
We have so far advocated the explicit presence of
an elimination process in models of the evolutionary
process. Correspondingly, we have defined and detailed
the structure of the SE-EA. It is now time to ask what
advantages we can expect from the adoption of this
approach in EC. We will consider first the case of
engineering applications in general, and then the more
particular cases of Artificial Life (ALife) [1], [82] and
Evolutionary Robotics (ER) [42], [53], [54], [85].
A. Engineering, Optimality and Prior Information
EA are usually considered and presented as optimiza-
tion tools. It is easily seen that we cannot consider
an EB-EA as a search or optimizing algorithm in the
conventional sense [80, p. 39], since at each time step
the result of the execution of the EB-EA is the extant
population (if any), whose paramount property is that of
being viable according to the current viability criterion.
On the one hand, however, the relevance of the interpre-
tation of evolution as optimization has been questioned
many times (see for example, [39] and [52]). Moreover,
although engineering is often assumed to be interested
mainly in optimal solutions, it is more appropriate to say
that engineering is the art of finding “good enough”, i.e.,
viable solutions to problems.
In a typical design scenario a range of tentative
solutions are first (ideally or concretely) considered and
the “not good enough” ones, i.e., the non viable ones
according to the given specifications, are discarded. It is
only when one or several eligible system structures and
parameters values have been found, that an optimization
process is possibly enforced on them. This optimization
process can be represented in terms of selection provided
that the problem can be formulated in terms of a single
scalar function to be maximized or minimized. Most
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real world problems, however, are multi-objective ones
and it usually difficult to aggregate them into a single
scalar function [33], [40]. If no obvious criterion for the
comparison and combination of the goals can be derived
from the statement of the problem, the imposition of the
aggregation of objectives can change substantially the
nature of the problem. This follows from the fact that this
forceful aggregation corresponds actually to assuming
as given information that is actually not available. For
example, considering again our familiar amplifier design
problem, it is usually difficult to quantify the relative
importance of, say, an increase in gain and an increase in
power supply noise rejection. There is usually an obvious
ordering of pairs of tentative solutions based on the fact
that one of them is better than the other relatively to some
criteria and not worse relatively to the remaining ones
(in the language of multi-criteria optimization it is said
that one solution dominates the other [33], [40]). This,
however, produces in general only a partial ordering of
the tentative solutions whereas if we specify a fitness
function we are assuming that this ordering is actually
available for all pairs of solutions. In the amplifier
design example this corresponds to the ability to order
in a linear sequence all possible amplifiers; a feat that
would impress the most knowledgeable of engineers. It is
true that in the process of natural evolution individuals
are ranked according to their reproductive success (or
fitness). We must not forget, however, that in nature the
sorting constituted by the relative reproductive success of
individuals emerges only a posteriori, as a consequence
of the interaction of the individuals with their environ-
ment. The potential complexity of this interaction and
the ensuing difficulties in modeling it in general, should
make us wary of the assumption that the information
to perform this sorting is available from the start in the
form of a fitness function.
In addition to this risk of assuming the availability
of a knowledge that is not actually there, there is the
complementary risk of disregarding knowledge about the
problem and its possible solutions that is available at the
beginning of the process. We have previously mentioned
the fact that in most real-world problems we have some
prior information on the results that one can reasonably
expect to achieve. We have observed that adopting the
viability elimination approach this information can be
utilized to define a target viability set. On the contrary,
it is easily seen that this information can be hardly if at
all utilized within an EA based on the fitness function
approach. Summing up, we can say that adopting the
conventional fitness function approach we can be forced
by the structure of the algorithm to disregard some
information that we actually have and to assume the
possession of information that we do not actually have.
With the addition of the viability elimination event to
the EA structure we acquire the possibility to avoid both
kinds of problem.
Considering the issue from a more abstract point of
view, we can remember that – as a consequence of the
No Free Lunch (NFL) theorems [29], [107] and contrary
to earlier expectations – no algorithm, be it evolutionary
or not, and be it based on selection or on elimination,
can aspire to be a “universal” search and optimization
procedure. In relation to this remark, it is interesting to
consider English’s analysis of the NFL theorems from
the point of view of information theory [41]. According
to this analysis, the NFL results stem from the fact
that for a generic optimization problem, the outcome
of a point evaluation is not informative with respect of
other possible evaluations and, therefore, in particular,
relatively to the localization of the optimal points, which
constitutes the aim of the process. Contrary to this, both
the realization that an individual is (at a given instant) vi-
able and the discovery that it is not, constitutes a piece of
relevant information for a process whose goal is the pro-
duction and preservation of a viable population. These
observations can be reformulated using the concepts of
System Theory [92] interpreting the genetic information
as representing the state of the evolutionary system [55].
In this perspective, the population22 is the memory of
the challenges and environmental interactions faced by
the past and present populations at all the organization
levels. This memory is updated by the evolutionary
process. From this point of view, the main advantage of
an SE-EA over a conventional SB-EA lies in its allowing
the collection information that reflects more closely the
information actually available thanks to its capability
of modeling (and let individuals experience) a greater
variety of evolutionary events.
B. ER, ALife, and Open-Ended Evolution
The previous observations relative to the engineer-
ing design process apply in part also to the field of
Artificial Life (ALife) [1], [82] and to that of Evolu-
tionary Robotics (ER) [42], [53], [54], [85], whose
problems can be considered as being halfway between
those of engineering and those of ALife. For example,
the separate applicability of different viability criteria
related to performances such as obstacle avoidance,
navigation, task completion, and so on, has the potential
to change substantially the way ER experiments are
22Or, better, the structures that function as ”bookkeeping entities”,
or “replicators” in the population [50], [57].
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set up and run. In the fields of ER and ALife, how-
ever, the problems constituted by the creativity and the
open-endedness of the process assume a new relevance.
These are particular cases of the the general problem
of the growth of knowledge considered at length by
evolutionary epistemologists (see for example [22], [23]
and references therein). Popper [88] identified the source
of this possible growth in a process of conjecture and
refutation, where we can easily to recognize in the
refutation a process of elimination for viability. From
this perspective, besides the problem constituted by the
generation of the conjectures - that we will provisionally
imagine as solved with some random process endowed
with sufficient generative potential - the problem remains
of how to choose the refutation criterion.
It has been argued that a major obstacle to the creativ-
ity of the evolutionary process in EC is constituted by
the constraint imposed by the explicit definition of the
fitness function (see, for example, the discussion on the
fitness space in [85, p. 65] and that on the endogenous
vs. exogenous fitness function in [82]). The elimination
perspective represents undoubtedly a progress in this
sense, since a negative injunction is less prescriptive than
a positive one (similarly to the proverbial country where
all that is not explicitly forbidden is allowed, which
enjoys more freedom than that where everything which is
not explicitly allowed is prohibited). Yet, it is not clear
if this progress can be considered sufficient. A really
creative solution, in fact, has the potential to change not
only how viability is achieved but also what must be
considered a viability condition23, whereas in the SE-
EA the viability conditions can be fully endogenously
generated only by populations of completely autonomous
individuals.
Some authors have indeed conjectured that in the
context of EC a truly creative evolutionary process
can be obtained only in the presence of autonomous
self-reproducing entities [79], [89]. It is clear that this
provision solves at once the problem of providing a
compelling and intrinsic causal foundation to the differ-
ential reproductive success that animates the evolutionary
process. However, until this provision can be actually
met, our goal remains that of ascertaining if an effective
evolutionary process, be it creative or ”merely” adapta-
tive, can be based on a partially extrinsic definition of
that causal foundation. In this respect, the agent-based
23In 1888 the mathematician David Hilbert gave a solution to
the central problem of invariant theory. However, his solution was
an existence proof while only computational solutions had been
previously considered acceptable by the leading experts in the field.
Thus, Hilbert’s revolution in invariant theory implied the creative act
of redefinition of the concept of “viable” solution.
example constituted by the growth of cultural knowledge
and the role attributed in it to the process of confutation
seems to speak for the centrality of elimination in any
foreseeable realization of that so far elusive goal. It
can well be the case, however, that a truly open-ended
evolutionary process mimicking closely what happens in
nature can be realized only at the price of relinquishing
the control over the process and its outcomes. As pointed
out by Lewontin [70, p. 10]
If genetic algorithms are to be used as a way
of solving engineering problems by analogy
to the supposed success of natural selection
in producing adaptation, then they must be
constructed for the limited domain on which
the analogy holds. The alternative is to evolve
machines and later to find uses for them to
which they are preadapted, a process not un-
known in human invention.
XIII. EXAMPLE: MULTI-OBJECTIVE PROBLEMS
We proceed now to illustrate the SE-EA approach
with an example. We consider the case of an elementary
multi-objective problem [33], [40] that we assume as
representative of the class of engineering problems de-
scribed in the previous section, namely, those concerned
with the search of a set of viable solutions relatively to
multiple criteria. As discussed above, we will adopt at
first the hypothesis that a target viability set is known.
Note that this assumption does not trivialize the problem
since once a population complying with the target viabil-
ity requirements has evolved we still have the problem
of how to further tighten the viability requirements to
improve the system performance. Moreover, there is in
general the possibility that new ways to realize the target
performance are discovered by the algorithm.
To ease the visualization of the algorithm’s workings
we consider a design problem where only two real-
valued system parameters x and y must be assigned. We
assume that some pre-defined system constraint limits
the set of admissible parameters is the two-dimensional
interval I = [xmin; xmax]  [ymin; ymax]  R2. A
potential solution is therefore constituted by a pair
 = (x; y) 2 I. To be acceptable, a solution must result
in an acceptable performance of the system. We repre-
sent this fact assuming as given p real-valued functions
vc(x; y) : I ! R ; c = 1; : : : ; p. Each function gives a
measure of a specific characteristic of the system for the
pair of parameters passed as argument. We assume that
a system with parameters (x; y) is acceptable only if the
value vc(x; y) of each function belongs to a specific set
Vc  R ; c = 1; : : : ; p. In the actual implementation we
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can obviously adopt a shortcut evaluation of viability,
that is, for each individual we can stop the evaluation of
the ensemble of functions vc as soon as we find a value
that lies outside the corresponding set Vc.
The rendition of these specifications in the vocabulary
of the SE-EA is straightforward. Each pair of param-
eters is considered as the phenotype of an individual
 = (x; y) 2 I  R2. The performance functions
vc() = vc(x; y) : I ! R ; c = 1; : : : ; p are
assumed as the p components of a viability function
v() = (v1(); : : : ; vp()) : I! Rp. We see that here the
viability space V corresponds to Rp. An individual is vi-
able if each component of the viability function belongs
to the corresponding set Vc. This condition corresponds
to the requirement that the viability value v() = v(x; y)
belongs to the viability set V = V1  : : :  Vp  Rp
obtained as the Cartesian product of the Vc. Usually the
sets Vc will change (independently) during the execution
of the algorithm. Hence, we will have a time-varying
viability set V (t) = V1(t)  : : :  Vp(t). The collection
of all these sets constitutes the viability tube. For the
phenotypes  we adopt a genetic encoding where the
genotype  is the concatenation of the binary represen-
tation (with linear scaling) of length b bits of the two
parameters x and y of .
Coming now to the SE-EA operators, we assume
that the reproduction operator r picks pairs of distinct
individuals of the existing population and performs on
their genotype two point crossover with probability pc,
and uniform mutation with probability pm [47]. This
means that the algorithm ignores the value of the selec-
tion function () (or, alternatively, assumes a constant
selection function) and implements actually the sole
elimination. The reproduction operator is defined so as to
assure that for each individual of the original population
nos new individuals are produced, where nos is a positive
integer. To facilitate the implementation of the case
nos = 1, and contrary to established GA practice, of the
two new individuals potentially produced by a crossover
operation, the reproduction operator retains only one.
In practice, a random permutation of the individuals of
the parent population is generated, and pairs of adjacent
individuals in the permutation (with wraparound at the
end of the list) are used to generate a single offspring
by crossover. The operation is repeated nos times. As
dictated by its definition, the elimination operator ev
returns a population that contains only the viable indi-
viduals of the argument population, constituted by the
union of the old population and of the population newly
generated by r. The contingency elimination operator
ec trims to max individuals the argument population
performing a random elimination on it. The termination
criterion is constituted by the time step counter reaching
a predefined value tmax or by the population going
extinct.
We can make this model a bit more interesting, and
illustrate an elementary case of state-dependent viabil-
ity, by implementing a structure of age-classes in the
population. To each individual we associate an age tag
(t) that is set to zero when the individual is gener-
ated and incremented (possibly stochastically) at each
generation. We then associate to the individuals a state
variable 

(t) = (; (t)) that is composed by the (fixed)
phenotype  and by the age tag (t). Correspondingly,
we add a viability condition that eliminates individuals
reaching a maximum age amax by defining an additional
set V = [0; amax] and redefining the viability set as
V (t) = V1(t): : :Vp(t)V and the viability function
as (

(t)) = (v1(); : : : ; vp(); (t)).
Finally, we must define the viability set update oper-
ator u and the criterion for the assignment of the initial
population and of the initial viability set. The update
of the viability set transforms progressively the initial
viability set into the target viability set. We can consider
several policies for this transition. Some of them do not
depend on the size of the population. For example, if
the sets Vi(t) are real intervals [li(t); Li(t)]  R we can
define a linear transition li(t) = li(0)+(li li(0)) t=tmax
from li(0) to li = li(tmax) or, more generally a power
law transition li(t) = li(0)+ (li  li(0)) (t=tmax) ;  >
0, with an analog rule for the upper limit. We will
adopt this approach in the first example below. To these
deterministic policies a small noise term n(t) can be
possibly added. Obviously, one can also consider policies
that depend on the population and on its dynamics. These
policies can be applied in particular when no target
viability set is given or to probe the possibilities of
further evolution of the population when the target is
met. Typically, in this case we will shrink a little the
viability set, observe the effect on the population and
readjust the viability set accordingly. Alternatively, one
can estimate the sensitivity of the population size to the
variation of each viability limit and use that information
to specify an updating policy for the viability set. This is
the approach that we will adopt in the second example
presented below.
When we decide to stop we are left with the indi-
viduals of the populations that did not go extinct. From
this set we can extract a subset of solutions according to
some additional criterion. For example, if the problem
can be interpreted as a multi-objective optimization one,
we could extract the non dominated solutions [33], [40].
Note, however, that even in this case the algorithm
does not aim at locating or representing faithfully the
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Pareto front [33], [40] which, in general, will lie partially
outside the viability set. We could also imagine a multi-
level algorithm where several populations are evolved
in parallel using different sets of algorithm parameters
for each population and the additional rule that if a
population goes extinct it is substituted by a copy of the
most florid extant one, with slightly mutated algorithm
parameters.
A. Example 1
We consider the case p = 2, i.e., the viability of the
system that is being designed depends on two character-
istics (say, the cost and the gain, in our amplifier design
example). We encode with b=10 bits each parameter in
the bi-dimensional interval I=[ 2; 2][ 2; 2]R2. The
viability function is (

(t)) = (v1(); v2(); (t)) =
(j sin((x+2y2))j; cos(9x (y 1)2); (t)) where (t)
is the age of the individual, which is set to zero at
creation and incremented by one at each generation. The
viability set has the form V (t) = V1(t)V2(t)V. The
first characteristic v1() will be considered a cost, hence
the corresponding set V1(t) will have the form [0; L1(t)].
The second characteristic v2() will be considered im-
proved with increased value, hence the corresponding
set V2(t) will have the form [l2(t); 1]. The knowledge
of the upper limit for V2(t), that in this case derives
from the viability function being given in closed form,
might appear artificial relatively to the case of real-world
problems. However, it is almost always the case that
in practice finite estimates of the limits of the viability
ranges can be deduced from the information available
about the problem. The age related viability condition is
specified by the set V = [0; amax]. The target viability
set is V = V 1V 2V, with V 1 = [0; L1] = [0; 0:25],
V 2 = [l2; 1] = [0:5; 1], and V = [0; amax] = [0; 3]. Note
that in our examples V does not change with time.
We generate a tentative initial population P 0(0) of o
individuals randomly in I. Then, we assign the initial
viability set so that all the individuals of the tentative
initial population P 0(0) result viable by putting L1(0) =
max2P 0(0) fv1()g and l2(0) = min2P 0(0) fv2()g. We
chose to enforce a linear transition from L1(0) to L1
and from l2(0) to l2 so that L1(t) = L1(0) + (L1  
L1(0)) t=tmax l2(t) = l2(0) + (l2   l2(0)) t=tmax. We
use a small number tmax = 7 of steps to perform the
transition form the initial to the target viability set, in
order to be able to display the whole evolution. The
termination function !(t; P (t)) is true when t = tmax or
the population size (P (t)) = 0, and false otherwise. We
start with a randomly generated population of o = 100
individuals and set the maximum number of individu-
als to max = 1000. The probability of crossover is
Figure 4. The evolution of the population while the viability
tube goes shrinking, as observed in the phenotype space I . The
shaded regions correspond to the non viable subset. Newly generated
individuals are represented by light points, whereas old individuals
are represented by darker points. Note that the initial viability set
is defined so as to make viable all randomly generated individuals.
The viability set shrinks progressively during the evolution, from the
initial set to a predefined target set, where the extant individuals (if
any) at the end of the evolution can be found.
pc = 1:0 and that of mutation is pm = 0:03. Finally,
the number nos of newly generated offspring for each
individual in the parent population is nos = 3, so that
P 0(t) = r(P (t);S(P (t))) has three times the size of
P (t). Figure 4 shows an example of evolution with
these parameters, observed in the space I of phenotypes.
Given the linearity of the updating of the viability set,
the viability tube corresponding to this evolution is a
truncated pyramid in the viability space-time V  T =
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R3  [0; tmax], with bases V (0) and V (tmax) = V .
B. Example 2
Now let us imagine that, given the final population
obtained in Example 1, we want to further tighten the
viability conditions. If our objective is just to modify
a single limit, say L2, we can proceed by simply ten-
tatively choosing a value for the variation that must be
applied at each further step to that limit, in our caseL2,
and proceed with the algorithm applying at each step the
selected variation to the limit. Imagine, however, that we
are instead interested in modifying the viability condi-
tions relatively to several performances. This means that
we must proceed to vary the viability limits for all the
characteristics that we intend to influence. The problem
in this case is that, in the absence of a target viability
set, we do not know a priori how to select an updating
policy for parameters that are referred to characteristics
which, as pointed out previously, have in general an
heterogeneous nature. To find a common measure for the
effect of the variation of the viability limits, we can refer
to the extension of the set I of viable individuals in I (see
Figure 1). For example, let us assume that in our case we
are interested in improving the solution relatively to both
L1 and l2. The extension of I (which, with some abuse
of notation, we will represent with the same symbol
I instead of, for example, jIj) will depend on both
parameters. Thus, we have I = I(L1; l2) and, therefore,
I(L1;l2)  @I=@L1L1 + @I=@l2l2. We now
assume that variations of parameters that produce the
same shrinking of I are “equally difficult” to achieve
from the point of view of the EA, since I corresponds
to the space available to the population. Hence, we will
try to vary the limits L1 and l2 so that the relation
@I=@L1L1 = @I=@l2l2 holds.
Now, in general, we don’t know the function I(l1; L2),
nor its partial derivatives. We can however estimate
ratio of the two partial derivatives using the information
constituted by the population that occupies I , which in
our case is the final population P obtained in Example 1.
If we assume that the population size (P ) is sufficiently
large, and that the population is distributed uniformly
within I , then, by varying the parameters L1 and l2
and observing the change in size of the population we
can obtain two values that correspond to an estimate
of the two partial derivatives multiplied by a same
constant k. In formulas, this corresponds to assuming
that for small L1 and l2 we have (P )=L1 
k @I=@L1 and (P )=l2  k @I=@l2. In practice,
we proceed to evaluate the relative variation jL1 =
(P )=(P )jL1 and jl2 = (P )=(P )jl2of the
Figure 5. We can estimate the sensitivity of the problem difficulty
to the variation of the viability limits observing the effects of a
variation of the limits on the size of a viable population. Here, an
ensemble of ten samples is obtained starting from the final population
obtained in Example 1. By least-squares approximating this samples
with a second order polynomial we obtain two continuous curves
1(L1) (continuous line) and 2(l2) (dashed line), whose slopes
e1   4:50 and e2   1:03 evaluated for L1 = 0 and l2 = 0
are our estimate of the sensitivities relatively to changes of L1 and
l2.
population size corresponding to various values of l1
and L2. Then we approximate with two continuous
curves 1(L1) and 2(l2) the two sets of samples
thus obtained (for example, with a least squares approx-
imation using a low order polynomial as approximating
function) and determine the slope of the curves at
L1 = 0 and l2 = 0. These values – let us call them
e1 = d1=dL1jL1=0 and e2 = d2=dl2jl2=0 – are
our estimates for k @I=@L1 and k @I=@l2, respectively
(Figure 5).
With the information constituted by e1 and e2 we
can now proceed to execute some further steps of the
algorithm. If the slope information represented by e1
and e2 can be considered valid for (P )=(P ) < ,
then we can restart our algorithm setting t = 0, taking
P as the initial population, defining L1(0) = L1and
l2(0) = l2 (that is, setting the initial value of the limits
to the values used to obtain the population P ), and
executing t0max time steps with the provision L1(t) =
L1(0)+=e1 t=t
0
max and l2(t) = l2(0) =e2 t=t0max, that
is, applying at each time step a variation L1 = =e1
and l2 = =e2 of the limits. Figure 6 shows the initial
and final population for the execution of t0max = 7 further
steps with the values of e1   4:50 and e2   1:03 and
the value of  = 0:1 obtained applying our method to the
case illustrated in Figure 5. If a further variation of the
viability conditions is required, the process just described
can be repeated using the final population thus obtained
to determine new estimates e01 and e02 for the sensitivities
and a new value 0 for their range of validity.
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Figure 6. With the information constituted by the estimate of the
sensitivity of the problem difficulty to the variation of the viability
limits, we can proceed to the execution of further steps of the SE-
EA. Here we show the initial and final populations for t0max = 7
and the values of e1 and e2 corresponding to the approximation of
Figure 5. What is here the initial population corresponds to the final
population of Figure 4. Note that the different magnitude of e1 and e2
correspond to a more severe shrinking of the initially wider “vertical”
stripes that determine the set I(0), relatively to the narrower parabolic
strips. The final population can be used to obtain a new estimate of
the sensitivity relatively to the newly obtained viability set. As could
be expected, the peculiarities of the history of the evolving population
lead the final population to desert some regions of the final viable
set I(tmax).
Note that this second example is not meant to maintain
that this particular approach to the extraction of informa-
tion about the problem must be the preferred one. The
point we want to make is that once we have supplied
to the algorithm (in terms of genetic coding, target
viability set, and so on) all the prior information in our
possession about the problem, new information can be
obtained through the history of the evolving population
subjected to the action of the algorithm. This includes
the extrapolations that can be based on that history, such
as the elementary extrapolation based only on the final
population, that we have utilized here.
XIV. CONCLUSIONS
Hull, Langman and Glenn [58, p. 53] defined selection
as “repeated cycles of replication, variation, and envi-
ronmental interaction so structured that environmental
interaction causes replication to be different”. To model
mathematically this process from the point of view of
its causes it is necessary to model not only replication
and variation, but also environmental interaction. The
founders of population genetics choose not to pursue this
approach and focused instead on the modeling of the out-
come of the process: differential replication. Correspond-
ingly, they introduced the concept of fitness to represent
it. They had good reason to do so, since the alternative
would have probably lead to evolutionary models of
excessive complexity. But the decision to describe or
define a process in terms of what is only an outcome
of its workings comes at a price: the reduction of the
empirical content of the model [56]. By subscribing to
this decision with the adoption of the fitness function
approach, EC has been forced to pay this price. We are
convinced that this is not only unnecessary but unwise,
given that EC experiments are supposed to implement
the process that leads to differential reproduction, not
model it mathematically.
The EC choice, therefore, should be instead the def-
inition and implementation of suitable models of the
interactions mentioned above. Here we have identified
and modeled two kinds of events that could represent
those interactions in EC experiments: selection events
and elimination events. Selection events imply an or-
dering of the individuals and can be represented by
the selection schemes based on the fitness function that
are used in present-day EA. To avoid confusion we
have simply suggested that what is now called “fitness
function” be renamed “selection function”. Elimination
events are instead based on a concept that does not
belong to the current paraphernalia of EC: that of state-
based viability. The addition of this kind of events
greatly enlarges the complexity and variety of causes
of differential reproductive success that can modeled
in EA. The consequence is the possibility to make the
information supplied to the evolutionary process reflect
more closely the prior information actually available, in
the dual sense of allowing the utilization of the existing
information and of avoiding the unfounded assumption
of additional spurious knowledge.
At best, the evolutionary process can use that infor-
mation and keep the population viable; at worst, the
population would go extinct. Nothing guarantees that
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the outcome of the process would be the former. If
the population goes systematically extinct then we know
that either our goal is unreasonable or something in the
way the evolutionary process is implemented is not up
to the task; probably the way variation is produced or
genetic memory is realized. But if we end up with an
extant population, and since we have not prevented the
possibility of extinction, then we can be confident that
the extant populations have adapted to the events they
have experienced. For better or worse, these are the rules
of the evolutionary game.
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